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Abstract 
 
With the opening of Central Eastern Europe German firms have gained access to low labor costs in close 
geographical proximity.  Intense debate about the impact this has had on the "German model" of capitalism 
has ensued.  This paper argues that, in fact, production shifts are taking place in which cost-cutting motives 
are an important guideline.  German firms, however, hesitate to aggressively utilize this new option in their 
internal domestic labor policy.  Rather, firms tend to avoid confrontations with their employees on "job 
exports".  The necessity of collaboration on both sides of the border, the relative strength of workers in the 
domestic high-quality production system, and the constraints of industrial relations provide explanations for 
the moderate behavior.  So far, the outcome of the bargained reorganization is that firms gain more labor 
flexibility, performance-related differentiation, and labor-cost rationalization without challenging the 
institutionalized long-term employment commitments for their core workforce. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2
 
Introduction 
The opening of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 has created a new opportunity for German firms 
similar to those of firms in the United States. They gained access to huge resources of cheap labor in 
geographical proximity. This ”tremendous opportunity,” as Lester Thurow (1999) puts it, to move labor-
intensive production toward Central and Eastern Europe raises two questions which I will discuss in this 
paper: First, why do German firms move production into their neighboring countries how important are 
cost-cutting motives for them? Second, have German firms exploited the new opportunity to break with social 
rules in their corporations at home that has so long prevented them from exploiting large wage differentials to 
the extent practiced by Anglo-Saxon firms? Do German firms use the new opportunities to impose changes 
on the basic rules and practices of the ”German model,” shifting toward the liberal, Anglo-Saxon market 
model?  
Lester Thurow has little doubt that German firms have to behave in this way. Other observers point out that 
firms can utilize the new opportunity to extort concessions form their employees even when they do not plan 
to shift production in the neighboring countries. Yet, the debate on institutional convergence and national 
diversity of capitalism provides also a different view. David Soskice and Peter Hall (1999) argue that firms 
develop distinctive corporate strategies and organization to capitalize on the institutions in which they are 
embedded. Hence, it is far from clear that firms from different institutional backgrounds would react to 
similar opportunities in the same way.  
Soskice and Hall characterize the German institutional framework in four dimensions or institutional spheres: 
1) a financial and corporate system that allows long-term financing of firms. Stable cross-company-
shareholding, close relations to a main bank and a legally institutionalized role for employees in the 
supervisory boards of large firms are key parts of this system; 2) industrial relations, in which collective 
bargaining equalize wages and labor regulations on the industrial level. In addition, strong co-determination 
gives works councils at firm-level considerable authority over lay-offs and working conditions. This makes lay-
offs difficult but encourages employees to invest in firm-specific skills, while fostering loyalty and extra 
efforts; 3) the educational and training system results in encompassing initial vocational training of young 
people, in which organized businesses and/or individual firms are closely involved. It provides firms with 
highly-skilled and specialized labor; and 4) there is an institutional intercompany system that enables 
substantial cooperation to take place between firms with regard to innovation and setting of industrial 
standards (Soskice 1999). 
In fact, based on this ”production regime” many German firms quite successfully competed with lower cost 
competitors in the 1980s. They moved into upper-end market segments with high-quality production and 
rising capital intensity. Small and medium-sized firms often further cultivated existing specialized niches, while 
large firms combined mass production with high-quality standards, increasing model variation and frequent 
incremental technical improvements. The underlying assumption behind this correlation between corporate   3
strategy and institutional framework is that German firms depend less on low-cost labor than their U.S. 
counterparts. Hence, German firms have less reason to move their activities out of the national economy even 
when faced with new access to low-cost labor. Consequently, lower labor costs in close spatial proximity 
appears far less challenging for the high-wage, high-regulate system. 
I argue in this paper that German firms have strong motivations to shift production to Central and Eastern 
Europe. Firms are interested in Central and Eastern Europe as an emerging market and as an opportunity for 
cost cutting. Those firms mainly from mature industries  have more and more problems with a home-
based production strategy, which avoids international competition by moving in upper-end product markets 
and increasing capital intensity. However at least until now, German firms have not utilized this ongoing 
cross-border reorganization for aggressive dismantling strategies of the labor-related parts of the German 
production regime. This does not mean that firms did not exert increasing pressure on the domestic 
workforce and their interest representatives in the ‘90s. But large firms in particular focused above all on more 
flexibility of this production regime and for rationalization of its costs. The outcomes so far are heavily shaped 
by the institutional logic of this framework.  
I outline this argument in three steps. First, I briefly describe the methodology of my analysis on which this 
paper is based. In section two and three, I will show that cost-issues are important motives for production 
shifts into this region and that this is linked to the limits of the mainly home-based, export-oriented high-
quality production system of German firms in the 1990s. In section four, I identify strategies of cross-border 
corporate reorganization that can be partly interpreted as a response to the limits of this production system. 
As cross-border reorganization I term the process in which firms arrange or rearrange different corporate 
units and functions across a border that leads to new labor divisions and specialization. Finally in section five, 
I show why German firms hesitate to dismantle the labor-related parts of the German production regime and 
what their alternative strategies are.  
 
Firm-Level Analysis 
The principal methodology of this research is a firm-level analysis. Between December 1998 and August 1999, 
I surveyed 30 German firms that have or have tried to establish production capacities in the form of 
subsidiaries, participation in existing firms or joint ventures in Poland and the Czech Republic (three firms 
from my sample eventually gave up their production facilities in these neighboring countries). I conducted 55 
confidential interviews (each two hours and more in length) with leading executives or company-owners. Also 
included in this study are interviews with works councils, union leaders and consultants in intermediary 
organizations. Beyond the interviews I visited factories and collected firm-data (internal statistics, annual 
reports from the last ten years, press releases or other available articles about the selected firms between 1989 
and 2000).  
The firm sample was not designed to be representative. It was designed to comprise a range of different kinds   4
of corporate strategies and reorganization patterns practiced by German firms across the border. Four criteria 
guided the clustering:  
a)  A first criterion is firm size. The geographical proximity of Poland and the Czech Republic attracts firms 
with different resources and international experiences. Investment in both countries is not only the domain 
of large firms. Many small firms are encouraged to look abroad. Thus, I strove to include firms of different 
sizes. Eleven of the 30 surveyed firms have a group size (including their new Polish or Czech plants) with 
fewer than 1,000 employees. Nineteen firms have more than 1,000 employees and among them are three 
multinational companies with more than 20,000 employees. Four of the large firms have invested in both 
countries. Nine firms have also invested in production capacities elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe 
(namely Romania, Hungary and/or Russia). 
b)  The second criterion was that the firms should belong to industries where—at least theoretically—both 
market-access and cost-cutting strategies might be relevant. Industries with dependence to the regional 
markets in the host countries (like the basic food industry) were excluded, since little reorganization on 
German side is likely to occur. At the same time, the selected firms should belong to industries that are 
relevant German investors in either country. Since in both countries the transportation equipment industry 
is a major foreign direct investor this industry receives high attention in my research, too. In the Czech 
Republic transportation equipment industry is the major foreign direct investor. In Poland this industry 
ranks closely behind the food and tobacco industry. Other important investing industries are the 
metalworking and electrical industry in general, the chemical industry (i.e. the those part which produces 
mainly consumer goods), furniture and textile.1 According to these guidelines, the following industry-mix 
was selected:  
 
Table 1: Branch origin of Surveyed Firms  
 
Industries  Firms  In the Czech Rep.  In Poland 
Transport equipment  11  6  5 
Metal products and electrical machinery  11  7  3 
Chemical and rubber products  3  2  1 
Other consumer goods   5  2  3 
Total 30  18  12 
 
c)  A further hypothesis is that the geographical distance between German firms and the selected location in 
Poland or the Czech Republic indicates differences in corporate strategies and organization. Referring to 
this spatial dimension, the sample consists of German firms that are both near the Polish or Czech border 
and those located in German industrial centers further away from the border. As a result, eight firm 
headquarters are located in Bavaria, near the Czech border, and four firms are located in Saxony near the 
                                                 
1   See Zemplinerova 1998, Witkowska 1997, Czechinvest, fact-sheet no 2, PAIZ 1999.   5
Czech and Polish border. Seven firms are located in northern Germany (including Lower Saxony). Another 
seven firms come from North-Rhine Westphalia, and three are located in the southern part of Germany, all 
seventeen being far from the border. 
d)  Finally, I am interested in different forms of capital involvement (subsidiaries, participation and joint 
ventures). The assumption here is that shared corporate control of existing enterprises leads to different 
corporate strategies and outcomes to investments in which no transformation of the existing organizational 
structures and workforce occurs (so called green field investment in contrast to brown field).2 Yet to find 
actual joint ventures turned out to be difficult. After a short period in the early 1990s, most German firms 
strove to get full ownership control. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of my sample represents firms 
with wholly owned subsidiaries. Twelve of the large firms followed this path, and almost all small and 
medium-sized firms control their Czech or Polish plants. Five large firms have started with a minority of 
the stock but raised their shares to majority control of up to 70 percent (and more) of the stock. Just one 
firm (a latecomer among the investors) controls less then 50 percent. Nine of the eleven small and 
medium-sized firms decided for green field investments. Eleven of the nineteen large firms did the same. 
Nine large and only one small firm took over an existing organization (brown field). 
 
Motives: Cost Cutting and New Product Markets 
In 1998, Western industrial countries attracted 87.7 percent of Germany’s rapidly growing direct investment 
(mainly Western Europe and the U.S.). Developing countries amounted to 6.6 percent, the countries in 
transition (Central and Eastern Europe) accounted for 5.7 percent, Asia for 4 percent and Latin America for 
2.5 percent (BMWi 1999). Both the high share of investment in other Western industrial countries and the 
high amount of investments in the service sector indicate that market motives continue to determine German 
business activities abroad.3 Yet also the flow of investment into Central and Eastern Europe continued to rise. 
In 1998 and even earlier in 1996, Poland ranked fifth among the host countries for German direct investment, 
while the Czech Republic held the tenth position (BMWi 1999, 1997). According to a survey of the U.S. 
consulting firm A.T. Kearney, Poland is the third most interesting place for German investors, followed by the 
Czech Republic (fifth rank) and Hungary in the tenth position (FAZ 2/23/2000). This makes Germany the 
largest single investor in Central and Eastern Europe (see Table A). 
In all of these countries the manufacturing sector figures prominently as a target for foreign direct investment 
(PAIZ 1999, Czechinvest 1999). Therefore macroeconomic analyses of investment outflows indicate that cost-
                                                 
2   Green field investment in the former Soviet block states mostly means that part of a state enterprise are 
bought (estate and buildings). Even part of the work force and few local managers were hired. Yet, foreign investors 
create their own, new corporate organization instead of taking over an existing one (brown field). 
3   See Kaufmann/Menke 1997: 94ff.; Härtel/Jungnickel 1996, Morsink 1998: 151, Deutsche Bundesbank 
1997, ifo Institut 1996.   6
cutting motives are driving the rising interest in Central and Eastern Europe.4 The existing surveys of firms on 
this issue, however, are not of one mind. DOWC Ost-West-Consult, a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank, for 
instance, has surveyed 500 firms, 80 percent of the 150 responding firms report the desire to gain market 
access as their most important motive for investment in Central and Eastern Europe. 48 percent report 
protection and expansion of their market shares as investment motives (though that might also refer to 
benefits of mixed price calculation to compete on Western markets), and only 41 percent note labor costs as a 
motive. Most of the surveyed firms were small and medium-sized (DOWC 1994: 17-19). In a survey of the 
German Genossenschaftsbank, the interest in the new product market also top the list, yet the authors note that 
labor cost motives are more relevant for small firms than for large ones (DG Bank 1996).5 In other surveys, 
market and labor cost motives share similar importance. Sometimes market motives figure prominently in 
German outward investments (Beyfuß 1996) while at other times labor costs are on top (ZVEI 1995, VBM 
1995, VDMA 1997).  
Yet there appears to exist different preferences in different industries. Especially in the metalworking and 
electrical industries cost cutting is more relevant than in others. Moreover, these industries are very important 
investors in the Polish and Czech manufacturing sector. In addition, shifts in motivation seem to depend on 
the geographic distance to Western Europe and the size of the host country markets. Cutting labor costs is a 
prominent motive of German firms investing in the Czech Republic; direct investment in Russia is seen first 
of all as a way to get access to the huge and distant Russian market (Beyfuß 1996: 28-29). Also the size of 
Poland seems to be more attractive for firms with market interests than the small Central European 
countries.6 
My firm-level analysis reflects both the high dynamic in the internationalization of production in the 1990s as 
well as the increasing concern to cut costs by moving production abroad. This is not exclusively but mainly 
related to the nearby eastern neighbors. For almost all firms with a group size of less than 1,000 employees, 
investments in Poland or the Czech Republic represent the first step in the internationalization of production. 
Most of the large firms already had outward production in the ‘70s or ‘80s (13 of 19 firms). Yet, this shift of 
production focused with few exceptions on gaining market access. Typical for the 1980s was that a wider 
range of large firms shipped production abroad. The U.S., East Asia and China became targets for such 
activities along with Western Europe. Joint ventures and acquisitions of existing firms were usually used to 
gain access to regional markets. Often these projects did not live up to expectations. Most of the surveyed 
firms with production facilities in the U.S. or Asia passed through an expensive and time-consuming learning 
process before seeing positive results. The growth rates on these markets were slow.  
                                                 
4   Beyfuß 1996: 6-13, Härtel/Jungnickel 1996: 20-28, Bundesbank 1997. 
5   See also Meyer 1995. 
6   See Deutsch-Polnische Industrie- und Handelskammer 1998, Jaworek 1999: 150, Kaufmann/Menke 1997. 
The differences in outcomes have also methodological reasons which I cannot debate in this paper. All surveys are 
highly selective, and they often include more or less random clusters of investors including services/sales and 
production.   7
Until the end of the 1980s, even the large firms studied remained highly home-based in their production, in 
spite of the rising number of production capacities abroad. This began to change in the 1990s when firms 
started to systematically expand their foreign direct investments. Still, at the end of the 1980s almost all 
studied firms had more than 60 percent of their workforce at home. The domestic workforce of only one 
chemical firm amounted to a share below 50 percent. At the end of the 1990s the share of the domestic 
workforce declined in every case by ten percent at least. In nine large firms the share dropped below 50 
percent (seven firms had a share of the domestic workforce around 40 percent and less), three firms had 
reduced the share of the domestic workforce below 60 percent. Meanwhile, most of the small firms retained a 
share above 60 percent. 
At first glance, my firm-level analysis confirms those surveys that have revealed a sharp difference in motives 
between the small and medium-sized firms on the one hand, and the large ones on the other. Around one-
third, i.e. 12 of the surveyed 30 firms, established production capacities in the Czech Republic or Poland in 
order to benefit exclusively from lower (labor) costs (Table 2). Among them are eight firms of this group that 
have less than 1,000 employees, and only four large firms that have established at least one location just for 
cost-cutting motives. A majority of the studied large firms, namely 15 out of 19, report a strategic interest in 
the emerging Central and East European markets. However, ten of those large 15 firms are concerned about 
cost benefits as well and they pursue mixed strategies. In fact, nine large firms were so strongly oriented 
toward cost cutting that this motive determined their whole corporate strategy and organization in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. Investments in production, logistic solutions for re-export, quality control and other 
production-related issues were clearly a priority. In other words, the corporation abroad was mainly designed 
to respond to Western or world market demands, while corporate strategies and capacities to develop the 
regional market were far less established. Hence, a closer examination of investment motives reveals that also 
among the large firms, a majority intended to reduce costs in order to compete in Western markets when they 
invested in the Czech Republic and Poland.  
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Table 2: Investment Motives of German Firms in Poland and the Czech Republic (n=30)  
 
Firm Size 
(Group) 
Market Motive  Mixed Motives  Cost Motives  Other Motives 
   with  dominant 
market interest 
with dominant cost 
interest 
  
< 1000  ---  1  1  8   1 
In        
Czech  R.  ---  1 1 6 1 
Poland  --- --- --- 2  --- 
> 1000  5  1  9  4  --- 
In       
Czech  R.  1 ---  5 3 --- 
Poland  4 1    4 1 --- 
Total  5  2  10  12  1 
 
There seems to be a greater interest in the Polish market than in the market of the Czech Republic. After the 
high expectation that this investment would create ”footholds” in the East European (GUS) market, the size 
of the domestic market became more crucial for market-oriented strategies.  
In sum, small and medium-sized firms tend to use a low-cost strategy exclusively, while the majority of firms 
with more than 1,000 employees pursue a mixture of market-expansion and cost-cutting measures for 
products offered on Western markets. While the spatial proximity has encouraged small and medium-sized 
firms to manufacture abroad, large firms are tempted to combine their market interests with cost-cutting 
strategies at home. In either case, cross-border reorganization is taking place. 
 
Driving Forces: Limits of Home-Based High-Quality Production 
The deep recession of 1992/93 turned out to be an important catalyst for German outward investments. 
During this crisis 13 studied firms suffered heavy losses in important parts of their industrial business (4 small 
and medium-sized companies, SMC). Two-thirds of the firms reduced their domestic employment (16 large 
firms, 5 SMC). Moreover, the recovery of orders by the firms occurred much faster than the recovery of the 
profit margins. Meanwhile, the industrial fluctuation—especially in the metalworking and electrical 
industries—remained hard to predict.  
The problems were twofold: On the one hand, firms were faced with growing international price competition 
in their traditional domestic and West European markets. Moreover, after the crises, customers became more 
price conscious and began to calculate harder if they should buy, for instance, expensive specialized equipment 
instead of limiting themselves to standardized solutions. This contributed to the pressure on the mainly home-
based high-quality production that offset higher labor costs by doing business in higher price markets and by 
increasing capital intensity. On the other hand, the potential growth markets for the German firms, like the   9
emerging markets or the U.S. market, were even more price-sensitive than the Western European market. 
Many producers, therefore, faced the situation that a market-expansion strategy by exporting ”Made in 
Germany” products was not only hampered by local content obligations and other market restrictions but also 
by high production costs.  
Still, there was additional pressure to move to Central and Eastern Europe. First, large firms often persuaded 
or forced their suppliers to follow them into Central and Eastern Europe. A well-known example of this kind 
of vertical interdependence is the engagement of the German automobile producer Volkswagen in the Czech 
Republic. In the early 1990s, Volkswagen began systematically to demand that key suppliers settle down in the 
countries where Volkswagen plants are located.7 In the case of the joint venture with the Czech automobile 
firm Skoda, a high share of local supplies were part of the contract with the Czech government who feared 
that Volkswagen would desert the domestic suppliers of Skoda. Yet Volkswagen also urged its own German 
suppliers to follow the company because they could use the lower wage scales in the Czech Republic to scale 
down their prices. In my sample, all seven suppliers of the vehicle industry found their way into Poland or the 
Czech Republic because of this pressure. And one can find similar developments in other industries like the 
packaging industry that accompanied their traditional customers abroad. Sometimes investors coordinate their 
orders to raise incentives for joint suppliers to follow them. Sometimes large firms even sent their suppliers or 
subcontractors as ”pioneers” into this region, allowing them to take more time for their decision and to test 
the new field. 
Second, once firms began to offer ”mixed prices” calculated on German and low-cost wages, customers also 
learned to demand similar prices from the competitors of those firms. Facing price drops, competitors were 
challenged to either enhance their productivity by further rationalization and automatization or to shift 
production abroad as well. In other words, the ”pioneers” of shipping production abroad raised the incentives 
and increased pressure for latecomers.  
A third pressure could be observed in very large firms. In the second part of the 1990s, the front-runners of 
internationalization successfully established a profit-oriented management style. The salaries and carriers of 
executives were linked to stipulated profit margins based on available market data, the performance of publicly 
traded competitors and the business outlook of the particular industry. This institutional change also began to 
influence the decision making-process about what should be kept at home and what would be better produced 
in a lower-cost country. Yet, it is important to note that there are huge differences in how far large firms 
pushed themselves in this direction. Small and medium-sized firms appeared even less inclined to imitate the 
”pioneers” among the large firms. 
In sum, the increasing interest of German firms in cross-border reorganization in the 1990s was not only 
triggered by new opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. The recession in the early 1990s and its 
aftermath revealed the limits of a high-quality, home-based production in mature German industries that up 
                                                 
7   See for the Czech Republic Dörr/Kessel 1999.   10
until that point had offset growing international price competition by moving upmarket. Once underway, 
additional pressure accelerated cross-border reorganization.  
 
Strategies of Cross-Border Reorganization 
Five strategies of cross-border reorganization between German firms and their Polish and Czech 
plants were identified. Since especially large firms have often more than one motive to invest in 
both countries, they often combine different strategies (see Table B). 
The first strategy is the extended workbench. Labor-intensive and low-skilled operations were cut out of the 
existing production processes of German plants and moved across the border. Outside of Germany, the semi-
finished products were assembled or completed with low-tech machinery and often subsequently re-exported. 
The management boards of such workbenches were small. Sometimes this pattern is compared with the U.S. 
assembly industry along the northern Mexican border (Pavílnek and Smith 1998). Yet unlike U.S. 
”maquiladoras” the main investors in Czech and Polish extended work benches were small and medium-sized 
firms. Nine of the eleven small and medium-sized firms in my sample pursued this strategy. Only five large 
firms used this approach in one of their Czech or Polish production locations. 
The next strategy can be identified as vertical reintegration. Vertical reintegration is an approach for large 
firms with complex products that invested in existing Polish or Czech enterprises (brown field investments). 
In the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, large firms began to reduce costs by outsourcing parts of their value-
added production chain. At the beginning, this production was shifted toward nearby domestic suppliers. 
Later, companies tried to move the less sophisticated components toward Central and Eastern Europe. 
Sometimes those components were first given to subcontractors abroad but then reintegrated in wholly 
owned subsidiaries. So firms exploited the cost advantage and organized their demands without worrying 
about unintentionally strengthening their supplier. Vertical integration is not a strategy that determines a whole 
plant. In all six cases I found it was combined with other strategies.  
The third strategy I have called the ”made-by” strategy.8 Companies not only shift some labor-intensive work 
places across the border, but also complete the manufacturing process for complex components and products. 
The brand name of the German firms guarantees that high quality standards are met. They do this chiefly with 
German or German/Western ”socialized” expatriates9, fast implementation of new concepts of quality 
control, and high capital investments in quality-sensitive operations. Because of this orientation toward high 
quality local content remains low and the supply is focused on low-tech components. Yet this is not 
necessarily a permanent arrangement. On the contrary, firms try to find regional suppliers or raise their local 
content successively through German suppliers who have settled in Poland or the Czech Republic. Also in 
other respects ”made by” is a dynamic pattern that often starts as an extended workbench but, if successful 
                                                 
8   I have borrowed this term from Suzanne Bergers and Richard K. Lesters "Made by Hongkong." 
9   In Poland such expatriates are often former Polish emigrants who had left Poland in the time of the Martial 
Law in the ‘80s.   11
leads to the addition of further production and functions. In the end, even newly developed products can be 
shifted abroad when profit margins are too low in Germany. Consequently, the studied plants became partly 
responsible for the product, receiving a larger number of qualified jobs in quality control, purchasing, 
development and construction. ”Made-by” often included both labor-intensive work and higher skilled or 
capital-intensive work. Therefore, firms favored brown field investment where they obtained easy access to 
experienced and skilled workers. Five firms in the study were moving in this direction. In two cases this was 
directly combined with regional market interests. These are two engineering firms, which produce their basic 
machines in their Czech and Polish plants—the basic machine includes the complete machinery without the 
electronic installation, hydraulics and the customized configuration of the machine tools. At the same time the 
existing program for the standardized (complete) machines of the Polish and Czech firms was continued and 
modernized.  
The fourth cross-border reorganization concept represents the ”two-brands” strategy that Volkswagen had 
developed for its Czech Skoda-enterprise.10 This strategy was adapted by other vehicle producers, and can also 
be found in other industries. Five large firms in my sample are moving in this direction. The core idea is that 
the investor combines high-quality and high-price products with products for a lower-price segment for both 
the Central/East European and the West European markets. Sometimes, lower-price products were still 
manufactured by the German firm at home but came under enormous price competition. In other cases, 
German firms had already given up lower-price markets when they moved further upmarket in higher price 
and quality segments. Unlike the ”made by” strategy, the Czech or Polish companies produced under their 
own brand name. Mostly, this is the traditional brand name of the firm, which was taken over. Yet, I have also 
found three examples of green field investments where a new ”second-brand” was created. The ”two-brands” 
strategy implies that at least part of the marketing and sales is located in the host countries. In a few cases 
companies have located some research and development functions as well. 
The fifth pattern can be described as follow-up reorganization when large firms build and rebuild their 
international production networks. This pattern has nothing to do with production shifts motivated by cost 
cutting, and it cannot be traced back to the limits of the German high-quality production system. Cross-border 
reorganization occurs when the demands of customers undergo change. With the implementation of the 
platform-strategy by Volkswagen in the mid-1990s, for instance, different new automobile models were 
constructed on one basic construction (platform). Suppliers, who initially moved to the Czech Republic 
exclusively to fill Skoda orders, now deliver to other European Volkswagen plants as well. Firms were thus 
forced to adjust their internal labor division that in the initial period of expansion had often been simply 
designed as a ”one order-one factory” (which lasted as long as a certain automobile model was produced). 
Changing market conditions can also trigger follow-up reorganization as well as changes in the political-
                                                 
10   Constanze Kurz and Volker Wittke called this type of cross-border reorganization ”complementary 
specialization” because those products supplement the bottom part of the product range of the western manufacturers 
(1999: 83). Since the ”made by” strategy is a sort of complementary specialization, too, I prefer the term coined by 
the firms themselves to describe this strategy.   12
institutional conditions (for instance, diminishing toll duties within Europe and between EU and Central and 
Eastern Europe). It is important to note that Polish and Czech plants have a quite good position in the follow-
up cross-border reorganization because of their lower labor costs, qualified workforce, their relatively modern 
equipment and good logistical position within Europe. 
 
Bargained Reorganization 
We have, in sum, seen that German firms do use the new opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe to 
reorganize their production structures. Moreover, we have seen that cost cutting is important in this respect. 
The patterns of cross-border reorganization do at least in part react to the constraints of the major home-
based, high-quality production that most observers in the 1980s perceived as a great success. The absolute 
decline of the domestic workforce especially in the large firms studied emphasizes that a serious redefinition 
of corporate strategy and organization is under way. Eleven out of 18 large firms had fewer domestic 
employees at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning of that decade, while subsequent growth took place 
abroad. 
Have German firms utilized lower wages and labor regulation in Central and Eastern Europe for frontal 
assaults on the labor-related part of the domestic German production regime? My answer is no. Rather, firms 
tried to avoid situations in which lay-offs at home were directly linked to production shifts abroad. Often they 
have staggered workforce reduction so as to exploit ”natural” fluctuations due, for example, to 
retirement or workforce in peripheral plants was reduced. Firms also compensated for lost jobs by adding 
new ones for products in higher priced market segments for which at least part of the existing workforce was 
retrained. Severe cuts were mostly undertaken during the crisis in the early 1990s that can be traced back to 
general economic problems rather than to production shifts. The realized growth abroad may have worried 
the domestic workforce but it has not touched them immediately. In short, managers and owners showed little 
propensity to play hardball with their works councils and workforce on this issue.  
Few companies decided to move their entire production abroad, while the headquarters, R&D, service and 
marketing/sales remained in Germany. One instructive example is a Bavarian family firm that was bought by a 
large U.S. company in the early 1990s. Let me outline this case briefly: 
The U.S. company, in fact, tried to dismantle the German model. One of the first measures was to quit the 
employer's association. The works council’s response to this was to force the company to accept a firm-based, 
individual contract that contained the main tenets of the industry-wide contract (including the 35-hour week 
of the metalworking industry). In the mid-1990s, the company began to shift production toward a German 
subcontractor in the Czech Republic. Three years later, the company decided to close the German production 
completely and to establish a wholly owned manufacturing subsidiary in the Czech Republic where they had 
bought an old industrial complex planned to set shop. Only marketing/sales, R&D and a small headquarters 
were to remain in Germany. The Czech government promoted this investment with tax advantages and   13
subsidies for a training program. But the German works council fought back. Its members pointed to 
opportunities for rationalization and argued that the risks and costs of the decision had been underestimated. 
The employees demonstrated, and the city government became involved. The major arena for bargaining, 
however, was the supervisory board in which, according to German law, works councils and the unions are 
regular members. The American executive president agreed to call for a second opinion by an external 
consulting company. The works council also received some funding from the company to hire a consulting 
firm of their choice. As a result, the German firm had exactly one year to reorganize itself, to introduce new 
organizational concepts and to reduce product variation. At the years end, the final decision would be made. 
In addition, the management of the German firm was replaced and a further drop in employment was 
announced. The works council and the union, however, could prevent wage cuts and the abolishment of the 
35-hour week. Moreover, the American management agreed to establish a so called ”employment company” 
(Beschäftigungsgesellschaft) for those who lost their job and could not immediately find a new one. This 
”employment company” had already become a model for other German works councils of the U.S. parent 
company. Finally, it was determined that instead of the moving German production, a British unit of the 
parent company would be moved to the Czech Republic. 
This example illuminates that the German works councils in cooperation with unions  are still powerful 
enough to impose bargaining upon cross-border reorganization. The U.S. managers acknowledged the faults 
of their original concept. But they also noted that they depended on the German employees for the success of 
new production facilities in the neighboring country.  
Managers are even more aware of such dependence when they do not plan a radical shift of production 
abroad since they see no necessity to do so or consider it as too risky. In these cases, we can observe a further 
upgrading of the (remaining) German production to highly specialized, skill intensive or innovative products 
with better profit margins. In capital-intensive production systems the shift of technical equipment abroad 
also elicits upgrading in skills because it is replaced more quickly by the most advanced automated 
technologies.  
In addition, during the 1990s many firms adapted new organizational concepts like short-term delivery (just-
in-time), team work or total quality control where quality control was widely integrated into the production 
itself. Such concepts make the production system even more vulnerable to industrial strife.11 Although works 
councils and employees cannot really block cross-border reorganization, they can still turn the firms’ interest 
in cooperative relations into bargaining power (see also Dörre 1999). At least for large companies, cooperation 
with the workforce is still heavily embedded in the formal structure of the German industrial relation system, 
with entrenched works councils and a strong union presence. This is certainly one reason why in spite of 
increasing tensions the large firms I studied did not seriously undertake efforts to abolish collective 
agreements or to withdraw from the bargaining table with the unions. They took into account instead that 
                                                 
11   Kathleen Thelen explains by way of the vulnerability of the new organizational concepts why German firms 
have been unwilling so far to break with the institution of collective industrial-wide bargaining (Thelen and Kume 
1999, Thelen 2000). This argument is similar to mine.   14
small and medium-sized firms get increasingly upset by the large firm dominated policy of employer’s 
associations. 
In very large firms the strong position of German works councils and unions actually encourages cooperative 
labor relations in the Czech and Polish plants. If we look at Table C the large firms do not show a single 
response as to how they deal with interest representation. Some of them have strong non-cooperative 
attitudes; others have even accepted workers’ representatives at their supervisory boards when they do not 
have to. That is the case in Poland where no such rule exists. Yet, what we can observe is that the cooperative 
pattern is more stable in very large firms. I argue that this is linked to the strong position of works councils 
and unions within large German industrial firms and their capability to establish cross-border exchange on 
their own. Though the interests of employees on both sides are different in important respects, this exchange 
supports the organization of collective bargaining and encourages workers’ representative to address demands. 
In one case the firm-level union even prevailed in determining conditions of German works councils in large 
firms. They negotiated exemptions from their regular work hours. Yet it must be also noted that for workers’ 
representatives in very large firms it is easier to develop and stabilize cross-border relations than in smaller 
companies. Large firms provide more personnel and material resources (for instance, addressing issues like 
language gaps). They can also take advantage of the new concept of European Works Councils. Though the 
influence of this committee is limited, it provides a platform for cross-border communication among workers’ 
representatives in which Czech or Polish representatives have been included. Finally, large firms are much 
more in the public eye and therefore more sensitive to issues that can ruin their reputation, especially when 
such incidents can easily be communicated across the border.  
In other words, the way in which especially large firms cope with the new challenges and opportunities in the 
1990s does not focus on a radical model shift in labor relations toward the Anglo-Saxon liberal market model. 
Where does the pressure of firms go? Three areas are important here: 
a) The strongest pressure that firms exerted on the labor-related parts of the German production regime in the 
‘90s was pressure on greater labor flexibility that would help them to adapt to the more volatile market 
fluctuations. The range of solutions has in common: They aim to allow more institutional flexibility without 
challenging the fundamentals of the long-term employment commitment between employers and the core 
workforce.  So firms have attained greater hire and fire flexibility through increased use of temporary 
workforce (Leiharbeit/ befristete Einstellungen) that can be easily laid off again. Another way to gain more labor 
flexibility is the increase in working-time flexibility. The most important innovation here are the so called 
”working-time accounts” (Arbeitszeitkonten) which were implemented in most of the studied large firms in the 
1990s. ”Working-time accounts” mean that employees work longer in peak times than the official working 
hours and this often implies that they need to work also on Saturdays. The over-time is not paid, instead the 
hours are saved in this ”time account”, from which during a whole year employers and employees can ”draw” 
hours for slower periods of production or for taking a day off. In addition, part-time work and early 
retirement for older employees lets firms renew their workforce without growth and without challenging the 
long-term employment commitment. Here the German welfare state comes in as a direct supporter that has to 
take over part of the cost of such solutions. But that is another story. 
b) Firms also began to cut their expenditures for which they were not contractually or legally obliged. 
”Working-time accounts” play a role here because, for instance, workers give up overtime earnings. Another 
strategy is to reduce the core workforce by outsourcing to subcontractors. In this way, part of their former 
workforce is excluded from the higher protection and wage standards within the firm. Important targets of   15
labor-cost rationalization are also pension plans and expenditures for vocational training. Many large firms 
began to reduce the number of trainees. This did not imply, however, that they intended to dismantle the in-
house system of vocational training. In fact, large firms have become heavily engaged in modernization of the 
professions offered by the vocational system to young people. Moreover, even at the end of the 1990s, annual 
reports of firms in my sample, as with manufacturing industries in general, provide more young people with 
apprenticeships than they can employ afterwards (see also Baethge 2000). This over-production is sometimes a 
direct outcome of collective bargaining agreements but it is also part of the firm symbolic management 
demonstrating ”social responsibility” and optimistic business outlooks. If large firms sign contracts to 
safeguard existing domestic production locations (Standortsicherungsverträge) with unions and works councils, 
vocational training is always a key issue. In return for substantial annual savings of personnel expenses which 
are achieved through cuts in the voluntary benefits granted by the company, firms give usually three time-
limited guaranties: employment guarantees, promises of capital expenditures or R&D spending in Germany 
and commitments to train more young people in their vocational training facilities than the company actually 
needs.12   
c) Finally, firms began to establish systems that linked salaries more directly to the earnings of the company. 
The new incentive systems are targeted mainly at executives and management staff who are not included in 
collective agreements. The industrial-wide collective wage agreements constrain the introduction of such firm-
level methods for wage earners. Yet there are also tendencies to link a larger part of the wages to firms’ 
performance, i.e. some large firms restructured their system of additional pay components in excess of the 
collectively agreed rates in the ´90s, to allow greater performance-related differentiation in pay levels. It will be 
a crucial question for the future as to what extent and how wage earners will be included into a more profit-
oriented incentive system; or vice versa, which consequences it would have for the social constitution of 
corporations when only some groups of the employees are involved in such a system. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarize my argument, there is enough evidence indicating that German firms do not simply expand 
their corporations and business into Central and Eastern Europe markets. Cross-border corporate 
reorganization is taking place in which cost-cutting motives are an important guideline. The conjunction of 
spatial proximity and low labor costs clearly foster this type of reorganization. Firms do not just take 
advantage from the new opportunity. Cross-border reorganization is also a response to the limits of the 
adjustment strategy in the ´80s, characterized by a mainly home-based production system, which serves the 
German quality-sensitive market and exports finished goods to Western Europe and the rest of the world. 
Outward investment has been part of this system since the 1950s. Yet they tended to stimulate further exports 
                                                 
12   Working time flexibilization for operational reasons are also part of the agreements.  
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from the German parent companies and therefore to maintain domestic employment, which is not for sure 
anymore.  
German firms hesitate to utilize the low cost option in proximity aggressively in their internal labor policy at 
home. Rather, they tend to avoid confrontations with their employees on production shifts. The necessity of 
collaboration between both sides of the border, the relative strength of workers in the domestic high-quality 
production system and the constraints of the industrial relations system provide explanations for this rather 
moderate behavior. In other words, exploiting the new opportunities in order to impose changes on the basic 
rules and practices of the ”German model,” shifting toward the liberal, Anglo-Saxon market model is still 
pretty risky for manufacturers in mature industries (whatever individual preferences might be). This keeps 
firms behind the bargaining table in spite of the greater asymmetry in labor relations caused by higher capital 
mobility. The outcomes of the bargained reorganization so far is that firms gain more labor flexibility, 
performance-related differentiation and labor-cost rationalization without challenging the long-term 
employment commitments, institutionalized in the German production regime. A well-known consequence of 
this kind of adaptation is that it protects mainly the existing and shrinking core workforce.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Table A: Direct investment of the 14 industrial countries in selected countries in transition* 
 
Item  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1990-97 
Total  (in  US$  billion  0.9 1.8 3.0 4.9 4.2 9.2 7.0  5.8 36.7 
Shares of individual 
countries (in %) 
          
Germany  17.8 14.0 35.0 29.6 45.1 30.1 (50.7) (41.5)  (36.8) 
United  States  16.9 11.7 15.7 25.1 12.1 14.5 .  .  . 
Austria  43.0 27.6 15.1 10.6 10.2 6.7  (5.0)  (14.8)  (11.1) 
France  5.0  11.7 11.3 5.8  5.9  14.4 (10.9) (15.1)  (11.1) 
United  Kingdom 0.2 0.3 1.9 0.7 4.8 0.9 (2.8) .  . 
* For 1997 no data for the United States and United Kingdom. The percentages in brackets were calculates 
without these data and are therefore distorted upwards. 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, October 1999 
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Table B: Gross-Border Activities and Labor Demands of 18 Large German Manufacturers in Poland and the Czech Republic 
 
Firm 
Code 
Firm size  Mix of Strategies  Labor or 
Capital 
Intensive 
Brown or 
Green Field 
Investment 
Skill-Demands on Shop-Floor  Dominant 
Gender on 
Shop-Floor
B/P  1,100  Reintegration, market expansion Labor  Green Skilled  Male 
N/T  1,200  Made by/ market expansion Mix  Brown  Highly  skilled  Male 
G/T 1,700  Extended  workbench,  market  expansion Labor  Green  Unskilled  Male 
H/P 2,000  Two-brands,  expansion Labor  Green  Skilled  Male 
D/T 2,500  Extended  workbench, market expansion, 
follow-up reorg. 
Labor Brown/green  Unskilled/  semi-skilled  Mixed 
E/T 3,000  Extended  workbench, market expansion, 
follow-up reorg. 
Labor Green  Unskilled  Female 
A/P  3,400  Made by/ two brands  Mix Brown  Highly  skilled  Male 
F/T   5,000  Reintegration, made by, little local market  Labor  Brown  Skilled  Male 
B/T 6,000  Two-brands  Labor  Green  Semi-skilled  Mixed 
E/P 6,000  Extended  workbench  Labor  Green  Unskilled  Female 
J/P   6,000  Made by, growing interest in market 
expansion 
Labor Brown  Mixed  Mixed 
K/P  7,500  Market expansion with local brands Capital  Green  Unskilled  Mixed 
L/P  11,000  Market expansion with local and 
international brands, follow-up reorg. 
Capital Brown Unskilled  Mixed 
C/T  15,500  Market expansion/ follow-up reorg.  Capital  Green  Unskilled work besides high skilled 
jobs for technicians 
Male 
D/P 17,000  Market  expansion  Capital  Brown  Unskilled  Mixed 
A/T  <20,000  In different locations: made by, 
reintegration, extended workbench, 
market expansion 
Mixed and labor Brown/ green Skilled/  unskilled  Mixed 
F/P  <20,000  Reintegration, market expansion, in other 
places: two brands and made by 
Labor and 
capital 
Green and 
brown 
Skilled Male 
G/P <20,000  Market  expansion, extended workbench, 
shift toward two brands 
Labor Green  Skilled  Male 
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Table C: Industrial Relations of 18 Large German Manufacturers in Poland and the Czech Republic  
 
Firm 
Code 
Firm Size  Size of the 
Sample-
Company in 
the Host 
Countries 
Brown or 
Green field 
Investment 
Works Councils at 
home (WC), Whole 
German Company 
Works  Councils 
(GCW),  Euro 
Works Councils 
(EWC) 
Enterprise 
Unions in the 
Host Countries
Acceptance of 
Trade Unions 
Outside of the 
Firm as Partner 
by Local 
Management  
Frequent Wage 
Bargaining 
Regular Cross-
Border 
Consultations 
Among 
Workers' 
Representatives
B/P 1,100  150  Green  WC  Yes  Cooperative  First  time  ---- 
N/T  1,200  800  Brown  WC  Non-union form 
of representation
Coop., but owner 
intervened 
----  ---- 
G/T  1,700  300  Green  WC, GCW   Yes  Coop.  Yes  ---- 
H/P  2,000  390  Green  WC, GCW  Yes  Non-coop.  Non-regular  ---- 
D/T  2,500  700  Brown/Gree
n 
WC, GCW  ----  Non-coop.  ----  ---- 
E/T 3,000  650  Green  WC,  GCW  ----  Non-coop.  Yes  ---- 
A/P  3,400  470  Brown  WC, GCW  Yes  Coop.  Yes  ---- 
F/T  5,000**  580  Brown  WC, GCW, ECW  Yes  Non-coop.  Yes  Yes 
B/T  6,000  500  Green  WC,  GCW  ---- Non-coop.  ---- ---- 
E/P  6,000  2,500  Green  WC  Yes Coop.  Yes ---- 
J/P  6,000  920*  Brown  WC,  GCW  Yes Coop.  Yes ---- 
 K/P  7,500  200  Green  WC, GCW  Yes  Non-coop.  ----  ---- 
L/P  11,000  1,500  Brown  WC, GCW (including 
representatives of the 
host country 
Yes Coop.  Yes Yes 
C/T  15,500  300  Green  WC, GCW  Yes  Non-coop.  Yes  ---- 
D/P  17,000  480  Brown  WC, GCW, ECW  Yes  Coop.  Yes  ---- 
A/T  <20,000  1,700*  Brown  WC, GCW, ECW  Yes  Coop.  Yes  Yes 
F/P  <20,000  2,400*  Green   WC, GCW, ECW  Yes  Coop.  Yes  Yes 
G/P  <20,000  300  Green  WC, GCW, informal 
European meetings 
Yes Coop.  Yes Yes 
* The parent companies of those firms have more than one manufacturing company in Poland or/and the Czech Republic. Hence the number of 
employees is actual higher, shadowed firms have Polish or Czech managers as leading executives. 
** This German company became part of a foreign multinational enterprise in the ‘90s.  19
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